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Safeguarding Against Failure in Intellectual Character Education: 
The Case of the Eristic Agent 
Abstract: The vast majority of contemporary scholars (e.g. MacAllister, 2012; Baehr, 
2013, 2016; Pritchard, 2013, 2016) working in intellectual character education endeavor 
to identify those elements that render an educational program reliably successful at 
fostering the growth of intellectual excellences in students. In this paper, I adopt an 
opposite perspective: I examine potential reasons as to why virtue-based approaches to 
education might fail to enable students to acquire intellectual virtues.  
Given the scarcity of accounts of educational failure in contemporary intellectual 
character education, I search for such accounts in the philosophical roots of the concept 
of intellectual virtues. In this paper, I focus on Plato’s discussion of the eristic agent, viz. 
an individual who has developed epistemically valuable cognitive abilities but, due to 
insufficient moral character education, results in misusing them to pursue non-epistemic 
and quite often also non-moral ends.  
I argue that Plato’s account of the eristic practice has much to offer to intellectual 
character education today. It strongly indicates that intellectual virtues cannot be fostered 
in isolation from moral virtues and that the development of the students’ (i) epistemic 
emotions and (ii) moral virtues should take place prior to the fostering of intellectual 
excellences in them.  
Keywords: intellectual character education, educational failure, Plato, eristic.   
Introductory Remarks  
Following the formulation (Sosa, 1980) and subsequent growth - from the 80’s onwards - of 
contemporary virtue approaches to epistemology (e.g. Baehr, 2011, 2016b; Code, 1987; Greco, 
2002, 2010; Pritchard 2005, 2010; Sosa, 1991, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996), the concept of intellectual 
virtues has, in recent years, also been introduced to education (e.g. Baehr 2016; Battaly, 2006; 
Kotzee, 2013; Pritchard, 2013). Prior to that, contemporary virtue approaches to education were 
predominantly concerned with the fostering of moral virtues in students1 (e.g. Carr, 1991).  
There is no universally accepted definition of the notion of intellectual virtues in 
contemporary virtue epistemology. Virtue scholars, depending on their conception of intellectual 
virtues, are often categorized into two groups: (i) virtue reliabilists (this group includes scholars 
such as Sosa, 1991; Greco, 2002; Pritchard, 2005) and (ii) virtue responsibilists (this group 
includes scholars such as Code, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996; Roberts and Wood, 2007). Virtue 
reliabilists conceive of intellectual virtues as faculty-based (Greco and Turri, 2011). They define 
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intellectual virtues as innate faculties or acquired habits that ‘help maximize one's surplus of truth 
over error’ (Sosa, 1991, p. 225) and proceed to categorize epistemically valuable faculties, such as 
good memory and perception, as intellectual virtues (thus the term faculty-based virtues). 
Contrarily, virtue responsibilists conceive of intellectual virtues as character-based (Greco and 
Turri, 2011). They define intellectual virtues as acquired excellences, for which the agent is 
responsible, ‘…involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end’ (Zagzebski, 
1996, p. 137) and proceed to identify epistemically valuable character traits, such as intellectual 
humility and conscientiousness, as intellectual virtues (thus the term character-based virtues). 
Yet, despite their theoretical differences, contemporary virtue epistemologists argue that the 
principal goal of every educational program should be to enable students to excel intellectually - 
that is, to develop intellectual virtues. Significantly, according to Baehr (who is a virtue 
responsibilist), ‘fostering growth in intellectual virtues should be the central educational aim’ 
(2013, p. 249). Similarly, according to Pritchard (who is a virtue reliabilist), ‘a core epistemic end 
of educations consists in the enhancement of the subject’s cognitive abilities and intellectual 
virtues’ (2016, p. 113). Batally summarizes the primary goal of intellectual character education 
quite concisely: ‘Many of us not only want our students to learn about better ways of thinking, but 
to become better thinkers. We want our students to become skilled in deductive and inductive 
reasoning… and to care about truth for its own sake. In short, we want our students to become 
intellectually virtuous’ (2006, p. 191).  
The vast majority of studies on intellectual character education (e.g. Baehr, 2013, 2016; 
MacAllister, 2012; Pritchard, 2013, 2016) primarily look into, or aspire to create, accounts of 
successful intellectual virtue education (in the sense of being reliably successful at fostering the 
growth of epistemic virtues in students). As far as I am aware, very few attempts2 have been made 
in contemporary intellectual virtue education to develop theoretical accounts of how educating in 
epistemic virtues might fail (I consider unsuccessful the kind of intellectual character education 
that aims at fostering the growth of epistemic virtues in students but fails to do so on a consistent 
and reliable basis). Given this scarcity of accounts of educational failure in contemporary 
intellectual character education, I look for such accounts in the philosophical history of the 
concept. In this paper, I focus on one such account: Plato’s discussion in the Republic of how 
intellectual virtue education might go astray and produce eristic agents (viz., agents who use their 
cognitive abilities for non-epistemic and non-virtuous purposes). The chief merit of looking into 
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Plato’s account of the eristic agent is that it can provide us with unique insights on how intellectual 
character education might go wrong and thus help us safeguard, as much as possible, against such 
failures from occurring in practice.  
I begin my discussion with a short summary of the rigorous Platonic educational program as 
presented in the Republic. Through this brief synopsis, I identify Plato’s educational goals and 
methods for guaranteeing the success of his program. I proceed to discuss Plato’s description of 
the eristic individual and his account of how such an agent is produced by educational failure. My 
discussion focuses on Plato’s account of the eristic agent and the practice of eristics as described 
in the Republic (VII, 537e-540a), though it also includes extracts from early Socratic dialogues3 
such as the Meno and the Gorgias. Then, I move on to argue that the Platonic account of the eristic 
agent can be of significant merit for contemporary virtue education. Plato’s account of eristics 
indicates that intellectual virtues cannot be fostered in isolation from moral virtues and that the 
development of the students’ (i) epistemic emotions and (ii) moral virtues should take place prior 
to the fostering of intellectual excellences in them. 
The Platonic Educational Program  
The philosopher-kings’ decades-long educational regime is a central theme of the Republic. 
Plato’s abandonment of Socratic intellectualism4 and the development - from the middle dialogues 
onwards - of the tripartite theory of the soul, plays a key role in the formulation of his educational 
theory. The soul is now understood by Plato as having three parts - (i) the rational, (ii) the spirited 
and (iii) the appetitive - with each part desiring a different kind of objects: the rational part has 
desires of a rational nature (e.g. truth and wisdom), the spirited part has desires of a spirited nature 
(e.g. honor) and the appetitive part has desires of an appetitive nature (e.g. food and sexual 
intercourse) (Rep., IV, 439a-440e). Having opposing desires5 (on account of its different parts), 
the human soul will be in constant internal conflict and imbalance. This is unless the soul is led by 
reason and all three parts of it, realizing their natural role, co-exist in harmony (X, 589a5-c). Still, 
a harmonious soul led by reason can only be brought about through the right moral character 
education (IV, 442a) that aims at the development of moral virtues such as for example the virtue 
of self-control6 and justice7 (435a-b). This fostering of moral virtues leading to a harmonious soul 
is a central aim of the Platonic educational program.    
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Nevertheless, developing moral virtues in students is not the end goal of the Platonic 
educational regime. Its ultimate aim is to enable students to reach understanding of the Forms. 
Having a harmonious soul led by rational desires is a necessary condition for epistemic success 
(i.e. the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth) but not a sufficient one. In order to be 
epistemically successful, an agent also needs to develop epistemically valuable cognitive abilities 
(in the sense that they help the agent acquire epistemic goods) such as the ability to think abstractly 
and the ability to debate. According to Plato, it is only those who have acquired an intellectual 
grasp of the Forms who should rule the city-state because they are the only people who, having 
seen the Forms, will attempt to imitate the Forms’ divine patterns in their ruling. Having seen the 
Forms, philosopher-kings are wise in both practical and theoretical matters (Rep., VII, 540a2-
540b5). In the Republic, science, morality and statesmanship merge (Rowe, 1984, p. 66). The ideal 
city-state, in order to exist, needs to be ruled by philosopher-kings; and philosopher-kings, to exist, 
need the right educational system. This is principally why Plato dedicates a large part of the 
Republic to presenting and defending his educational theory. 
Hence, the Platonic educational regime has two fundamental goals: (i) the development of 
harmonious souls and steady characters in students (through the acquisition of moral virtues) and 
(ii) the development of intellectual virtues. And what is most significant is that it starts with the 
former before proceeding to ensure the latter. The guardians’ education begins with literary (Rep., 
III, 376c5-403c5) and physical/military education (403c5-412a). This early stage of the 
educational program aims at fostering the growth of a steady character and a harmonious soul in 
students (VII, 522a5-b). Guardians who have demonstrated an aptitude for learning will proceed 
to the second stage which consists of the study of the five mathematical sciences: arithmetic (524e-
526c), plane geometry (526d-527c), solid geometry (527d-528e), astronomy (529a-530c) and 
harmonics (530d-531c). The principal aim of this second stage is to train guardians in abstract 
thinking - which is a necessary cognitive ability for those who will advance to the study of the 
dialectic (527b10-c). Finally, those who have excelled in their studies, will now be introduced to 
the final stage of Plato’s educational program: the study of the dialectic (531d-534e). Those fully 
trained in the methodology of the dialectic, acquire the cognitive ability of debate: they are experts 
at giving an account of the essence of each thing and ask and answer questions with the highest 
precision (534). According to Plato, those who employ the dialectical method successfully are able 
to reach understanding of the Forms, including the Form of the good (532a). The completion of 
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Plato’s educational program in its entirety takes approximately fifty years and only a handful of 
students complete all of its stages successfully.  
The Platonic Account of the Eristic Individual  
Still, in his discussion of the ideal city-state, Plato does not only develop a detailed account 
of his educational program; he also produces and discusses an account of how virtue education, if 
not properly structured, can fail to produce philosophers (i.e. lovers of wisdom: agents motivated 
by their rational desires for the acquisition of epistemic goods) and instead result in producing 
eristic agents (i.e. individuals who employ their cognitive abilities for personal, non-epistemic, 
ends). Plato’s account of educational failure is presented at the last part of book VII of the Republic 
- right after he has finished discussing the curriculum of the philosopher’s education - and serves 
as a cautionary tale. 
In this section of the Republic, Plato contrasts the practice of eristics (which was taught and 
practiced by the sophists) with the methodology of the dialectic (which Plato identifies as the 
methodology followed by his philosopher-kings). According to Plato, the eristic agents are 
sophists and rhetoricians who, following the eristic practice, develop arguments that are often 
absurd or paradoxical and use them as a means of beating the competitions and/or for the 
entertainment of the crowd (Beresford and Brown, 2005). Their goal is to lead their opponents, 
through elaborate arguments, to contradict themselves and/or reach implausible conclusions8. In 
contrast, being motivated by their rational desires, philosophers develop arguments that aim at 
finding truth (VII, 539c10-15). For the untrained eye, it is easy to confuse the practice of eristics 
with the methodology of the dialectic (Beresford and Brown, 2005, p. 156). Still, their difference 
is not methodological but one of purpose (Nehamas, 1990, pp. 8-9 - see also Kerferd, 1981, p. 66). 
The eristic agents are expert at the dialectic but misuse it: they employ it for the purpose of beating 
their opponents in debate rather than as a method for searching for truth.  
The Platonic account of the eristic agent and his discussion of the educational failure that 
brings about such agents begins with Socrates’ warning that the study of the dialectic fills students 
with indiscipline (Rep., VII, 537e3) because it shows to them that the popular opinions (on what 
is right and honorable) they have been brought up from childhood are wrong (538c). Having lost 
their respect for their previously held beliefs, students will be led to believe that there is no 
difference between right and wrong, honorable and disgraceful and will turn to a life dedicated to 
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the pursuit of appetitive desires (538e-539a9). It is for these reasons, therefore, that according to 
Plato, great precaution must be taken to not educate students in the dialectical method when they 
are not ready:  
 
‘“Then if you want to avoid being sorry for your thirty-year-olders, you must be very careful 
how you introduce them to such discussions.” 
“Very Careful” 
“And there’s one great precaution you can take, which is to stop their getting a taste of them 
too young. You must have noticed, how young men, after their first taste of argument, are 
always contradicting people just for the fun of it; they imitate those whom they hear cross-
examining each other, and themselves cross-examine, other people like puppies who love to 
pull and tear at anything within reach”’ (539b, trans. Lee)10. 
 
But what is it that makes one ready to be introduced to the study of the dialectic? According 
to Plato, it is only men and women11 of steady and disciplined character combined with a 
harmonious soul (i.e. agents who have developed moral virtues and their soul is led by the rational 
part) that should be educated in the methodology of the dialectic (Rep., VII, 539d12). Such agents 
will not turn to the pursuit of appetitive desires once they realize that the popular opinions they 
have been brought up with are wrong. Having strong rational desires, they will persevere in their 
quest for the acquisition of epistemic goods.  
Sections 538e to 539d of the Republic shows that in the absence of moral virtues, dialectical 
expertise leads to sophistry. For Plato, the criterion demarcating agents that employ their 
dialectical expertise for epistemic goods from agents that employ it for non-epistemic ends is a 
steady and disciplined character. As already noted, the practice of sophistry and the methodology 
of the dialectic are not different methods of argument - their difference lies in the intentions and 
goals of the agents. Philosophers (i.e. agents who have developed moral virtues and are motivated 
by their rational desires) employ the dialectic method for what it is (i.e. a method for searching for 
truth) and are not interested in who wins or loses the debate; they are solely interested in 
formulating arguments that are aimed at finding the truth (539c10-15). They work together rather 
than against each other. This collaboration between interlocutors is summarized in the Meno13:  
 
‘And if the man who’d asked the questions was one of those expert quibblers (eristic 
agents) who just want to “win” arguments then what I’d say to him is this: “Look, I’ve 
made my claim. If what I’m saying isn’t right that’s your problem: it’s up to you to question 
me and prove me wrong” But if the two of us were friends and wanted to talk things 
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through, with one another - the way you and I are doing now - then I’d have to go a bit 
easier on him and answer in a more talk-it-through kind of way. And I suppose “a more 
talk-it-through kind of way” means not just giving an answer that’s true but also only 
answering by way of things the other person admits he knows, when you ask him’ (75 c-d, 
trans. Beresford).  
 
Philosophers are partners in their quest for the truth. They do not seek to outsmart their 
interlocutors with (unnecessarily) elaborate answers. They answer using points which the other 
party can comprehend.  
Those who have not had the right character training and have not thus developed a steady and 
disciplined character and a harmonious soul (i.e. agents who have not developed moral virtues and 
their soul is not led by the rational part) will end up developing eristic arguments if trained in the 
dialectic. Such agents will be motivated to act by non-rational desires (e.g. out of their desire for 
honor or moneymaking) and will simply be interested in scoring points against their opponents 
(Rep., V, 454a-c).   
Of course, the topic of eristics - also known as sophistry (Nehamas, 1990, p. 4): the practice 
of using elaborate arguments for personal gain - is not discussed for the first time in the Republic. 
Plato makes numerous remarks about the sophists and their teachings of eristics in a number of 
dialogues that predate the Republic. For example, sophistry is discussed extensively in the 
Gorgias. Socrates’ main argument in this early Socratic dialogue is quite similar to the one Plato 
makes in the Republic (although Socrates does not link it - at least not as clearly as Plato does in 
the Republic - to educational failure). He argues that being an expert at the method of the dialectic 
without having developed moral virtues and a rational desire for rational goods leads to sophistry, 
i.e. developing elaborate arguments in order to beat others in debate for the sole purpose of 
promoting personal benefit. Replying to Gorgias’ claim that sophistry is the highest of skills, 
Socrates argues that it is not actually a skill (techne) but a knack: It seeks at flattery with no 
consideration of what is best; and cannot give an account of the essence of each thing (Gorg., 
465a). In the Euthydemus, Plato notes that the agent following the eristic practice is a much larger 
threat for herself and society than the agent who, lacking training in the dialectic, avoids engaging 
in philosophical discussions:   
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‘For I suppose there is more mischief when a man uses anything wrongly than when he lets 
it alone. In the one case there is evil; in the other there is neither evil nor good’ (Euthyd., 
280e-281a, trans. Gifford).   
 
Overall, according to the Platonic account of eristics, if an agent lacking moral virtues and 
rational desires is trained in the methodology of the dialectic, they will end up employing the eristic 
practice: using ingenious arguments for non-epistemic reasons rather than out of genuine desire 
for the acquisition of epistemic goods.  
The Value of Plato’s Account of Educational Failure for Contemporary 
Virtue Education  
Both the virtue responsibilist and the virtue reliabilist approaches to virtue epistemology 
would perceive Plato’s account of the eristic agent alike: they would both attribute this agent’s 
actions to a lack of epistemic motivations. For the responsibilist camp, the eristic individual clearly 
lacks the motivational component of intellectual virtues that, according to them, is essential for an 
agent to possess intellectual virtues. For example, according to Baehr (2016b, p. 87), ‘A subject S 
possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S’s possession of V is rooted in a “love” of epistemic 
goods’ (for more on the motivational component of intellectual virtues see for example 
Montmarquet, 1993, p. 30; Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 305 and Zagzebski, 1996, p. 13714). Thus, 
for the virtue responsibilists, the eristic agent does not possess intellectual virtues because such an 
individual is not predisposed to act out of love for epistemic goods but out of desire to advance 
their (non-epistemic) self-interest.  
For the reliabilist camp, the eristic agent has developed an epistemically valuable (in the sense 
of enabling the agent to acquire epistemic goods) cognitive ability: the ability to formulate good 
arguments, give good replies and spot the weaknesses of their interlocutors’ arguments/positions. 
We can call this the cognitive ability of debate. If used properly, the cognitive ability of debate 
can help the agent maximize their ‘surplus of truth over error’ (Sosa, 1991, p. 225). However, the 
eristic agent uses their ability in debate for their own personal (non-epistemic) gain. Hence, for the 
virtue reliabilists, the eristic agent has developed an epistemically valuable ability but ends up 
misusing it - i.e. not using it in order to acquire epistemic goods.  
Plato’s account of the eristic agent highlights the importance of an education of emotions and 
moral virtues for epistemic success. Such education should be the cornerstone of every approach 
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to intellectual virtue education (irrespectively of whether this stems from a reliabilist or 
responsibilist understanding of intellectual virtues). The eristic individual is a case of educational 
failure resulting from introducing those who are not ready to the dialectic, and as such, highlights 
the fact that if one is given/taught the methodological tools without having the right epistemic 
motivation (a strong rational desire for rational goods) and a steady character (moral virtues) 
developed through the right character training, one is led to misuse of the cognitive abilities they 
have developed. For example, the eristic agent results in using their cognitive ability in debate for 
non-epistemic and non-moral purposes: consider, for instance, the case of a politician who is 
motivated to use any argument at their disposal, no matter how absurd, in order to gain advantage 
over their opponents in the political sphere - and that is why aspiring politicians from all over 
Greece came to Athens to be educated by the sophists in the practice of eristics.  
The Platonic account of the eristic agent shows that virtue-based approaches to education must 
start with the development of the students’ (i) moral virtues and (ii) epistemic emotions before 
proceeding to the development of intellectual virtues. Although distinct, these two main goals of 
virtue education (i.e. the development of moral virtues and the development of epistemic emotions) 
are closely interconnected: they both aim at safeguarding that the students will employ the 
cognitive abilities they will develop for the acquisition of epistemic goods.   
By fostering the growth of moral virtues, such as the virtue of honesty, character education 
ensures that students will not use the cognitive abilities they will later develop for non-moral 
purposes (e.g. to manipulate the public in order to make profit). Moreover, it also helps students 
develop moral virtues, such as the virtue of self-control, that are instrumental for their epistemic 
success. The virtue of self-control is quite significant for it enables students to control their non-
rational desires and thus allows them to dedicate their efforts in epistemic pursuits (rather than in 
the pursuit of unnecessary non-rational desires15) unhindered. For Plato, moral virtues are a 
necessary prerequisite for the development of intellectual ones: if students do not develop moral 
virtues they will be led by their appetitive desires (Rep., IX, 588d-589a4) and will have no interest 
in engaging in epistemic pursuits. This is why it is crucial that virtue education begins with the 
fostering of moral virtues before proceeding with the development of intellectual ones.  
Fostering the growth of epistemic emotions is also a goal of fundamental importance for 
character education. Epistemic emotions are emotions specifically directed at epistemic goods and  
play a significant role in our pursuit of such goods since they motivate us in our epistemic 
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endeavors (Morton, 2010, p. 385 - see also Stocker, 2010; Kashdan and Silvia, 2011; Brady, 2013, 
2014). Examples of such epistemic emotions include curiosity, wonder, intrigue and fascination 
(Turri, Alfano and Greco, 2017). Instilling in students such emotions safeguards that they will use 
the cognitive abilities they will later acquire for the acquisition of epistemic ends. According to 
the Platonic educational program, a key epistemic emotion that all students must develop at this 
early stage of virtue education is love for epistemic goods. Students should become philosophers 
(viz. lovers of wisdom). According to Plato, a philosopher is characterized by her passion for 
‘…wisdom of every kind without distinction’ (Rep., V, 475b), she is ‘…glad to learn and never 
satisfied’ (475c) and does not ‘…rest content with each set of particulars which opinion takes for 
reality, but soars with undimmed and unwearied passion till (she) grasps the nature of each thing’ 
(490b). Students who have developed such powerful epistemic emotions will have no interest in 
the pursuit of non-rational goods (485e).   
The importance Plato places on such character education as a precedent to the development 
of intellectual virtues is the reason why the Platonic educational program in the Republic begins 
with literary and physical education. This first stage of Plato’s educational program does not offer 
training in intellectual excellences - it aims at helping students develop a morally virtuous 
character that is led by reason:  
 
‘That…was the complement of their physical education. It gave a training by habituation, 
and used music and rhythm to produce a certain harmony and balance of character and not 
knowledge; and its literature, whether fictional or factual, had similar effects. There was 
nothing in it to produce the effect you are seeking (i.e. the transition from the phenomenal 
world to the reality of the Forms)’ (VII, 522a5-b). 
 
It is only after students have developed moral virtues, such as for example the virtue of self-control 
and justice, and after they have acquired a strong desire for rational goods that they are allowed to 
proceed to the study of the disciplines (i.e. the five mathematical studies and the dialectic) that will 
enable them to develop intellectual excellences.   
Plato’s account of the eristic agent shows that an education fostering the growth of moral 
virtues and epistemic emotions in students is a necessary prerequisite for epistemic success and 
should be the starting point of every virtue-based approach to education. This comes in contrast to 
intellectual virtue education theories currently being developed. The vast majority of 
contemporary scholars working on intellectual virtue education theories disregard the instrumental 
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role of also fostering moral virtues for epistemic success. They formulate intellectual character 
approaches without taking into consideration the importance of moral virtues for successful 
intellectual character education (see Baehr, 2013, 2016; Batally, 2016; MacAllister, 2012; 
Pritchard, 2013, 2016). Plato’s account of the eristic practice reveals the fact that intellectual 
virtues cannot be developed in isolation from moral virtues. Students who acquire cognitive 
abilities, such as the ability to make elaborate arguments, but have not developed a good character 
(i.e. have not developed moral virtues and a rational desire to acquire the truth) will result in 
employing those abilities for non-epistemic and quite often also non-moral ends. 
One might argue, contrarily to Plato, that there is nothing wrong with educating for intellectual 
virtues prior to the development of moral virtues. Still, I believe that Plato’s point according to 
which one cannot not successfully educate for intellectual virtues before educating for moral 
virtues is correct in both the case of fostering of faculty-based virtues and the case of fostering of 
character-based virtues.  
It is indeed the case that one needs to educate for moral virtues and epistemic emotions before 
educating for faculty-based virtues. Moral virtues (e.g. self-control) and epistemic emotions (e.g. 
love for epistemic goods) enable the students to practice epistemically valuable cognitive abilities 
for their intended purpose - i.e. the acquisition of epistemic goods. Students who have developed 
cognitive abilities before moral virtues, will have mastered to employ such abilities for the 
acquisition of non-epistemic goods. Were such students to acquire moral virtues after having 
acquired such cognitive abilities, they would lack the necessary knowledge of how to use such 
abilities for their intended purpose. For example, the student who possessed the cognitive virtue 
of debate prior to moral virtues would know how to use arguments in order to beat their opponents 
in debate for her personal gain (since she would have extensive practice on doing so) but would 
not know how to employ arguments in order to acquire epistemic goods.  
In the case of fostering character-based virtues, virtue responsibilists focus on the virtuous 
agent’s epistemic motivations rather than her reliability in acquiring epistemic goods. Still, having 
the proper orientation towards epistemic goods cannot possibly come prior to the development of 
moral virtues and epistemic emotions. Moral virtues (such as self-control) regulate non-rational 
desires thus enabling the cultivation of epistemic desires in students. Epistemic emotions (such as 
curiosity) are an integral element of the virtuous agent’s epistemic motivations - without them an 
agent cannot come to develop intellectual virtues.  
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One might also argue that safeguarding against the development of eristic agents is outside 
the scope of virtue reliabilism which advocates the growth of intellectual virtues such as various 
kinds of good reasoning. Still, facilitating reliabilist virtues alone does not suffice to protect 
students from becoming eristic agents. In order to educate agents to care about the truth for its own 
sake, the reliabilist educational project needs to build on a pedagogical program that fosters the 
development of the students' moral virtues and epistemic emotions. One could also endeavor to 
defend the virtue responsibilist position by arguing that the development of eristic agents is a non-
issue for them. After all, part of their educational program involves developing the students' 
motivation for truth thus safeguarding against educational failures such as pointed out by Plato’s 
account of the eristic agent. Still, figuring out exactly how to facilitate the growth of epistemic 
motivations in students remains somewhat unclear for the responsibilist view. In this paper, I argue 
that this kind of motivational training comes (necessarily) through the development of moral 
virtues and the growth of epistemic emotions. Without such motivational training, the 
responsibilist educational project remains incomplete and vulnerable to failure.   
Concluding Remarks  
My aim in this paper has been to look into Plato’s account of the eristic individual, as 
presented in Book Seven of the Republic, and explore what this account has to offer to 
contemporary approaches to virtue education that aim at fostering the growth of intellectual virtues 
in students. I argue that the insights derived from Plato’s account of the eristic agent are quite 
significant for contemporary intellectual character education. This Platonic account of educational 
failure sheds light to aspects of virtue education that contemporary scholars have overlooked but 
are instrumental in bringing about success in intellectual character education16. It highlights the 
dependence of intellectual excellences on moral virtues when it comes to virtue education (viz. the 
importance of moral character education for the epistemic success of the agent). It also indicates 
that virtue-based approaches to education that aspire to succeed in fostering the growth of 
intellectual virtues in students must necessarily begin with the instilling of epistemic emotions and 
moral virtues in them. 
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1That is not to say that educational accounts primarily concerned with moral character training haven’t also 
recently been developed. See Curren, 2014 and Kristjánsson, 2015.  
2Battaly, 2013 is such an attempt from an Aristotelian and Neo-Aristotelian perspective.   
3Throughout this paper, I follow Vlastos’ (1991) classification of early, middle and late Platonic dialogues. 
4The standard view is that Plato’s development of the tripartite division of the soul theory denotes his 
abandonment of Socratic intellectualism (see Cooper, 1984; Nehamas, 1999). Still, it should be noted that 
some scholars have contested this view (see Carone 2001; Sedley, 2013). However, agreement with the 
latter does not present a problem for my overall argument. The development of the tripartite theory of the 
soul, irrespectively of whether it is meant to replace Socratic intellectualism or not, plays a key role in the 
formulation of Plato’s educational theory.  
5See Plato’s example of opposing rational and appetitive desires: ‘Now, can we say that men are sometimes 
unwilling to drink even though they are thirsty? ...Then how are we to describe such cases? ...Must we not 
say that there is one element in their minds which bids them drink, and a second which prevents them and 
masters the first?’ (Rep., IV, 439c).  
6For the importance of developing the virtue of self-control so that an individual’s soul can be in harmony 
see Rep., IV, 442c5-15: ‘Then don’t we call him self-disciplined when all these three elements are in 
friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule 
and there is no civil war amongst them? That is exactly what we mean by self-control in a city or in an 
individual’.    
7For the importance of developing the virtue of justice so as to develop a harmonious soul see especially 
Rep., IV, 443d: ‘The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self to trespass 
on each other’s functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping all three in tune…will in the truest 
sense set his house to rights, attain self-master and order, and live on good terms with himself. When he 
has bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of 
many, he will be ready for action of any kind…’  
8See also Irwin, 1995, p. 585: ‘It is characteristic of the eristic to think of some argument as a way of 
defeating the other side, by showing that an opponent must assent to the negation of what he initially took 
himself to believe’.  
9‘Then when he’s lost any respect or feeling for his former beliefs but not yet found the truth, where is he 
likely to turn? Won’t it be to a life which flatters his (appetitive) desires?’  
10Throughout this paper, I am using Lee’s (Lee and Lane, 2007) translation of the Republic, Irwin’s (1979) 
translation of the Gorgias, Beresford’s (Beresford and Brown, 2005) translation of the Meno and Gifford’s 
(1905) translation of the Euthydemus. 
11‘And some of them will be women…all I have said about men applies equally to women’ (Rep., VII, 
540c).   
12‘In fact all we ‘ve been saying has been said in the attempt to ensure that only men of steady and 
disciplined character shall be admitted to philosophic discussions, and not anyone, however unqualified, as 
happens at present’.  
13Also, in the Gorgias (458a, trans. Irwin), Socrates impersonates the right approach to the method of the 
dialectic: ‘What kind of man am I? … One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say something 
untrue, and pleased to refute if someone else were to say something untrue, yet not at all less pleased to be 
refuted than to refute’.    
14For example, according to Zagzebski (1996, p. 137) all intellectual virtues involve a ‘characteristic 
motivation to produce a certain desired end’ while according to Robert and Woods (2007, p. 305) ‘love of 
knowledge’ is a ‘presupposition or necessary background of all the other intellectual virtues’.  
15Unnecessary desires are, in part, those desires whose presence is not beneficial to the agent: ‘Then do you 
think that, if we are to avoid arguing in the dark, we had better define the difference between necessary and 
unnecessary desires? Desires we can’t avoid, or whose satisfaction benefits us, can fairly be called 
necessary, I think. We are bound by our very nature to want to satisfy both, are we not? But we can call 
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‘unnecessary’ all desires which we can be got rid of with practice, if we start young, and whose presence 
either does us no good or positive harm’ (Rep., VIII, 558d10-559a10, trans. Lee). 
16I do not postulate that my discussion of Plato’s account of the eristic agent exhausts all possible causes 
for educational failure. Instead, I suggest some fundamental reasons (which the vast majority of 
contemporary scholars working in intellectual character education have overlooked) as to why, according 
to Plato, virtue-education might fail to produce intellectually virtuous students. 
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